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This paper explores innovation, experimentation, and creativity in the public domain and in 
the public interest. Researchers in various disciplines have studied public 
entrepreneurship, but there is little work in management and economics on the nature, 
incentives, constraints and boundaries of entrepreneurship directed to public ends. We 
identify a framework for analyzing public entrepreneurship and its relationship to private 




essential features but differ critically regarding the definition and measurement of 
objectives, the nature of the selection environment, and the opportunities for rent-seeking. 
We describe four levels of analysis for studying public entrepreneurship, provide 
examples, and suggest new research directions.  
 
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, public administration, political economy, institutions, 
transaction costs  
 
Jel codes:  






Thanks to Sarah Kaplan, Martin Kilduff, Costas Markides and seminar participants at the 
London Business School, Truman School of Public Affairs, Atlanta Competitive Advantage 
Conference, the DRUID Summer Conference, and Academy of Management for 
comments on an earlier version of this paper.  
 
Copyright © 2009 Peter Klein, Joseph Mahoney, Anita McGahan and Christos Pitelis. All 





The recent financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn have raised a host of new 
questions about the relationship between the private and public sectors (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
Legislators  and  regulators,  accused  of  being  passive  and  allowing  too  much  innovation  and 
experimentation during the boom years (e.g., in financial derivatives), have responded by vastly 
expanding their role in monetary, fiscal, and industrial policy (e.g., with ad hoc financial rescue, 
bailout, and stimulus programs). Public bodies are also becoming more active in shaping private 
innovation toward particular national and international objectives (e.g., alternative energy, climate-
change reduction).  Government itself is becoming more entrepreneurial, a salient example being the 
widespread legitimization in recent years of privatization and global outsourcing of functions that 
traditionally were performed by government such as the construction of roads, the operation of 
information technology systems, and the construction and operation of prisons (Engel, Fisher & 
Galetovic,  2006;  Gupta,  2008;  Morris,  2007).    In  short,  private  entrepreneurs  are  increasingly 
charged with serving public ends, while at the same time, government action is becoming more 
―entrepreneurial.‖  Is this a good idea?  
The  answer  depends  on  achieving  a  level  of  clarity  about  what  we  mean  by  ―public 
entrepreneurship.‖  This concept is imprecise in part because public interests, which change over 
time, are difficult to identify even under the best of circumstances. The unit of analysis for publicness 
is  also  complex:  in  cross  section,  the  local  community,  provincial  authorities,  small  and  large 
voluntary associations, nation-states, and the international community are all relevant.  Publicness 
changes over time just as the public interest changes.  Ostrom (1990) emphasizes that the resolution 
of public collective-action problems may occur through private action by voluntary, non-governmental 
associations. Calls for entrepreneurship and innovation in the public interest conjure up familiar 
visions of energy unleashed in pursuit of efficiency or innovation, but innovation in the public  
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interest also evokes ideas about the updating of staid, public institutions that have lost relevance and 
accountability.   
Public entrepreneurship, as we define it below, is both enabled and constrained by a political 
system and institutional context (Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004). The 
field of management would benefit from a systematic assessment of issues in the public interest that 
joins insights from transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1975), political science (Ostrom, 1990), 
international business studies (Henisz & Zelner, 2004), the theory of entrepreneurship (Foss et al., 
2008) and dynamic capabilities (Pitelis & Teece, 2010).  Despite important research in economics, 
history, government, international affairs, and political science focusing on major changes in public 
interests and public institutions (Guthrie & Durand, 2008; North, 2005; Olson, 2000), there is little 
research from first principles on management problems in public entrepreneurship. 
The  starting  point  for  our  analysis  is  the  idea  of  public  agents  as  nominal  stewards  of 
resources that are commonly or jointly owned by members of a community.  Public entrepreneur-
ship is manifest in a variety of activities, such as changing the institutional environment or rules of 
the game, establishing new public organizations, creating and managing new public resources, and 
taking advantage of spillovers by private action for the wider good.  These activities involve creating 
public resources and making resource-allocation decisions about them once they exist. Innovation in 
the public interest occurs when these resources are deployed in new ways based on new ideas about 
their relevance to public interests or new mechanisms for their deployment. Entrepreneurs pursuing 
public interests combine public resources in light of, and sometimes in concert with, private resources 
in pursuit of social objectives (Ostrom, 1990). 
Like private entrepreneurs, public entrepreneurs pursue a variety of objectives, including 
private gain.  The process of managing public entrepreneurial effort is thus complex.  We submit 
that familiar concepts of the entrepreneur from management and economics are useful for under- 
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standing resource allocation and economic change in non-market settings. Our analysis shows that 
public resources and their associated property rights must be defined, understood and managed 
effectively  for  innovation  to  occur  (Raymond,  2003).  While  the  analogy  between  the  private 
entrepreneur and the public entrepreneurial actor has limits and must be used with care, insights are 
available from theories of private entrepreneurship that draw on the conceptualization of entre-
preneurs as decision-makers in the allocation of scarce resources under uncertainty. 
Our goal is to develop a research agenda for analyzing public entrepreneurship in light of 
theory from management and economics. We begin by reviewing entrepreneurship concepts from 
these literatures, asking if and how these concepts shed light on public entrepreneurial behavior and 
institutions.  We  then  describe  four  levels  of  analysis  concerning  public  entrepreneurship,  and 
suggest new ways of interpreting and understanding public entrepreneurial using this framework. 
Finally, we extend North‘s (1990) idea of States as transaction-cost minimizing mechanisms that 
increase returns to ruling groups, noting that States can act entrepreneurially by realigning property 
rights and creating new governance mechanisms to increase returns -- often blurring private and 
public interests. We conclude with suggestions for advancing research and practice in public entre-
preneurship. 
Overall, the analysis extends and develops ideas about innovation in the public interest, 
clarifies how and why innovation may occur in the public domain, and points toward opportunities 
for further development of theory. One proposition is that public entrepreneurship not only can 
substitute for, but also can complement, private entrepreneurship. Private and public entrepreneurship are 
mutually dependent and co-evolve in ways that can be gradual or sudden and are often path-dependent (Ostrom, 
1990).  Moreover, while we are motivated centrally by an interest in informing public policy, we are 
equally motivated by a desire to spark research in the field of entrepreneurship on important issues 
related to public interests and public institutions.  By building on seminal contributions by Nobel  
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laureates, such as Arrow (1970), Coase (1960), North (1990), Ostrom (1990), and Williamson (1975), 
theories of entrepreneurship can be usefully leveraged to illuminate our understanding of property 
rights and of resource deployment.   
A caveat in this endeavor is that public interests may not be well defined (Walsh, Meyer & 
Schoonhoven).  First,  the  alignment  of  individual  objectives  into  a  public  interest  is  a  complex 
problem.  Mechanisms  such  as  majority  voting,  arbitration,  and  consensus-building  are  highly 
imperfect aggregators of individual interests (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Downs, 1957; Riker & 
Ordeshook, 1973), and under some conditions, aggregation may not even be possible (Arrow, 1951). 
Second,  individual  interests  are  multi-faceted,  and  apparent  alignment  may  reflect  problematic 
understandings and temporary compromises. Third, private interests are changing, which may mean 
that current declarations of the public interest are no longer valid (Mahoney, McGahan & Pitelis, 
2009; Stiglitz, 1998). Theoretical and empirical examination of the concept of the public interest is 
analogous to examination of the concept of corporate performance:  despite the challenges, the 
process of inquiry itself delivers rich insights about the phenomena. 
CONCEPTS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Entrepreneurship  is  often  conceived  as  innovation,  creativity,  the  establishment  of  new 
organizations or activities, or some kind of novelty.  Under this conceptualization, entrepreneurship 
occurs in markets, firms, government, and universities (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  But novelty alone 
is  an  incomplete  and  somewhat  simplistic  characterization.  The  economics  and  management 
literatures have also identified additional specific conceptualizations of entrepreneurship that are 
useful for understanding innovation in the public sector (Klein, 2008). We focus here on entre-
preneurship not as a specific individual or type of firm but as a function that can be performed by a 
variety of individuals under varying circumstances. In particular, three characterizations of the entre-
preneurial function have been identified in the literature: Kirzner‘s (1973) alertness to opportunities,  
 
6 
Knight‘s (1921) judgmental decision-making about investments under uncertainty, and Schumpeter‘s 
(1934) product, process, and market innovation.   
Below we consider each of these functional conceptions in turn. In doing so, we keep in 
mind some important differences between private and public entrepreneurial action.  For instance, 
while the entrepreneurial firm typically has well-defined objectives, can rely on market signals of 
success (economic profit) and failure (economic loss), and must overcome a competitive selection 
process to continue as a going concern, public actors have more complicated objectives, may not 
have access to clear signals of performance  --- in the words of Kornai (1986), face ―soft budget 
constraints‖ --- and may persevere for reasons other than customer satisfaction and shareholder 
wealth (Mueller, 2003).  Despite these differences, we think entrepreneurial concepts make sense in 
the context of public action. 
Entrepreneurship as opportunity identification 
In Kirzner‘s (1973, 1997) influential formulation, entrepreneurship is the facility of awareness, 
or alertness, to profit opportunities existing in a world of disequilibrium.  Productive factors may be available at 
prices below their discounted marginal revenue products; consumers may demand products that 
have not yet been produced; and arbitrage opportunities may not have been fully exploited.  A large 
literature on antecedents of entrepreneurial discovery (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003) 
focuses on how individuals perceive their environment, how they value factors and products, and 
how they communicate their discoveries to others.   
If profit opportunities are simply a superior way of doing things, then they are everywhere, 
including the political sphere (Schuler, Rehbein & Cramer, 2002). The entrepreneurship literature, 
however, defines profit opportunities more narrowly in terms of economic value creation aimed at private 
economic value capture. Shane defines an entrepreneurial opportunity as ―a situation in which a person 
can create a new means-ends framework for recombining resources that the entrepreneur believes will  
 
7 
yield a profit‖ (2003: 18). This profit can result from discrepancies between real (disequilibrium) prices 
and their long-run equilibrium values, and the entrepreneur ―proceeds by his alertness to discover 
and exploit situations in which he is able to sell for high prices that which he can buy for low prices. 
Pure entrepreneurial profit is the difference between the two sets of prices‖ (Kirzner, 1973: 48).  
If the objective of public entrepreneurship is to fulfill the public interest rather than to 
pursue private profit, can anything be gained from this conceptualization (Bernier & Hafsi, 2007)? In 
a non-market setting, this requires ideas about the values of public resources and public outputs.  
The analogy is that both private and public entrepreneurs perceive gaps between actual and potential 
outcomes or performance, and look for resources to close the gap. Where private entrepreneurs see 
a way to acquire resources and deploy them to achieve privately appropriable revenue in excess of 
costs, public entrepreneurs seek to marshal resources for fulfilling nominal public or social interests 
and  to  deploy  them  for  better  performance  on  public  objectives  (Ostrom,  1965,  2005).  Public 
objectives are closely linked to private ones, by definition, as they are part and parcel of the objective 
function of a private individual.  Therefore, the resolution of agency problems in the closing of gaps 
between actual and potential performance is central to public entrepreneurship.  
North (1990), subscribing to this characterization, emphasizes transaction costs as a primary 
source of inefficiency and suggests that appropriately crafted political structures can create economic 
value  by  reducing  these  costs.  More  generally  under  this  conceptualization,  private  and  public 
entrepreneurs share the same fundamental objective, i.e., to capture value out of their advantages, 
capabilities  and  action  potential  (Pitelis  &  Teece,  2010).  In  the  case  of  private  entrepreneurs 
economic value creation aimed at value capture (economic profit) is the criterion for success, while 
in the  case  of political  entrepreneurs,  the  private benefits accruing are only indirectly  linked to 
economic profits and may be realized in terms of popularity (e.g., electoral success) or some deferred 
reward rather than the direct, private appropriation of the created value.   
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Entrepreneurship as judgmental decision making 
A second major insight concerning the entrepreneur arises from Knight‘s (1921) concept of 
entrepreneurship as judgmental decision making about investments under uncertainty in terms of effectiveness in 
realizing objectives in the future.  While Kirzner‘s (1973) formulation emphasizes the entrepreneur‘s 
awareness  of  existing  profit  opportunities,  Knight‘s  (1921)  concept  reflects  the  idea  that  profit 
opportunities do not exist until gains and losses are realized ex post.  Judgment refers primarily to 
business decision making when the range of possible future outcomes, rather than the likelihood of 
particular  individual  outcomes,  is  unknown  --  what  Knight  (1921)  terms  uncertainty  rather  than 
probabilistic risk.  An important example is the purchase of factors of production in anticipation of 
future receipts from the sale of finished goods (Knight, 1921). In the public domain, this uncertainty 
takes on a character that is an order of magnitude and complexity higher than in the private domain 
precisely because resources are jointly owned and public interests and even the very definition of 
―public‖ may shift over time (Doering, 2007; Hirschman, 1982). 
The critical insight from this reasoning for the public domain relates to theory development 
concerning  uncertainty-bearing,  control  over  resources,  and  the  exercise  of  judgment  about  the 
efficiency of policies in fostering public interests. Under the Knightian (1921) conceptualization of 
entrepreneurship,  the  greatest  economic  returns  accrue  to  those  who  successfully  bear  market 
uncertainties,  which  often  requires  establishment  of  new  organizations  and  new  organizational 
forms and involves processes of experimentation, failure and learning. In public entrepreneurship, 
these ideas translate to the view that innovation requires making investments under uncertainty, 
which may require establishment of public organizations (for example regulatory bodies), and yield 
major returns for the public, but which also may lead to failure. The subsequent success or failure, in 
turn, will impact analogously to the reputation of the political actor (a private interest).   
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Entrepreneurship as innovation 
While Kirzner (1973) conceived of the entrepreneur as a force, helping to move prices and 
quantities toward their equilibrium values by exploiting gaps in the marketplace, Schumpeter (1934) 
saw the entrepreneur as a disequilibrating force. Even if all Kirznerian (1973) opportunities are fully 
exploited, scientific and technical discoveries that cannot be anticipated drive exogenous change.  
New sources of supply are found, and consumer demands change. The source of these exogenous 
shocks, according to Schumpeter (1928), is the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship, in this definition, 
disturbs existing patterns of resource allocation through bold, creative action. 
The analogy in public domains is that the public interest shifts. Old institutions become out-
dated. Innovation, both technological and organizational, is required but is difficult to accomplish 
because of conflict between short-run and long-term performance.  Entrenchment is deepened by 
agency problems and by lack of clarity about the public interest.  When uncertainty is abundant, 
public actors, charged with pursuit of the public interest, may pursue policies for private benefits.  
Most of the political entrepreneurship literature takes a Schumpeterian perspective, focusing 
on creative political innovations, which depend crucially on windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 1995; 
Mintrom, 2000) for modifying the way that public entities operate (Kuhnert, 2001; Mack, Green & 
Vedlitz, 2008; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008).  According to Teske and Schneider, entrepreneurs ―propel 
dynamic policy change in their community‖ (1994: 331). Schnellenbach (2007) denotes this kind of 
entrepreneurship as promoting political innovations.  On the other hand, political entrepreneurship 
often seems far removed from the bold, intrinsically motivated pursuit of novelty typically associated 
with Schumpeter (1934), often encompassing the mundane (Schnellenbach, 2007).  
Alertness, judgment, and innovation: property-rights issues 
Despite such differences, the relationship between the entrepreneur and the institutional 
environment may be similar across the private and public sectors. Ostrom (1990) maintains that  
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unlocking  the  human  potential  of  individuals  requires  an  opening  of  both  public  and  private 
institutions  to  mobilize  collective  action  and  to  attenuate  opportunism/free-riding  (Hirschman, 
1982; Olson, 1965; Williamson, 1996). In particular, effective public entrepreneurship requires the co-evolution 
of an active public enterprise system together with a vigorous private enterprise system (Ostrom, 2005). Public 
entrepreneurship can bring together unique combinations of public and private resources to take 
advantage of social opportunities (Kearney, Hisrich & Roche, 2007; Morris & Jones, 1999).  The 
quality of institutional arrangements supporting public entrepreneurship is crucial for democratic 
capitalism (North, 1990; Sheingate, 2003). Furthermore, the processes by which these public and 
private  systems  interact  are  worthy  of  careful  attention  in  the  next  generation  of  management 
research (Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; Hitt, 2005; Keim & Hillman, 2008). 
Public entrepreneurship can also be conceived as the creation or definition of property rights in ways 
that make private and political action more efficient and effective (Barzel, 1989; Foss & Foss, 2005), usually 
subject to the perception by the political actor that this will confer personal gain. As Holcombe 
notes, ―if political goals are not being implemented in the least-cost way, then there is a profit 
opportunity from restructuring the nature of the government activity so that the goals are achieved 
at least cost. The cost savings are a political profit that the entrepreneur can then apply toward the 
satisfaction of other goals‖ (2002: 147). Such goals usually relate to re-election (or, for civil servants, 
promotion or expanded authority) and in cases even to private appropriation of pecuniary benefits. 
If the political actor is a private entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs seeking to use the political 
system to achieve economic goals -- e.g., an industry association lobbying for an import tariff or a 
firm  seeking  regulation  that  raises  rivals‘  costs  (McWilliams,  Van  Fleet &  Cory,  2002;  Salop  & 
Scheffman, 1983), -- then the goals may be strictly pecuniary. Thus, one opportunity for the develop-
ment of the theory of public entrepreneurship is in integrating a conception of value capture-seeking  
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private and public entrepreneurs with a framework that accepts the complexity of private and public 
institutions deployed to frame and pursue the public interest (Kaplan & Murray 2009). 
Besides the issue of measuring gains from trade in politics, another important distinction is 
between  market and political  behavior: the  allocation of  resources through politics is based  on 
forced transfers rather than through voluntary consent. Thus, political actors can benefit (materially 
or in utility terms) from forcibly transferring resources from one individual or group to another.  
Holcombe states that: ―If the political support lost from those who pay for the transfer is less than 
the political gain in support from the recipients, then the political entrepreneur can profit from such 
a forced transfer‖ (2002: 147). Hence, the exchange of resources through political markets cannot be 
presumed to be Pareto efficient (Bonardi, Hillman & Keim, 2005; Capron & Chatain, 2008). In 
Baumol‘s  (1990)  terminology,  entrepreneurship  can  be  productive,  unproductive  or  destructive. 
Destructive  political  entrepreneurship  includes  not  only  forced  wealth  transfers  resulting  from 
regulatory capture or other forms of rent seeking but also the discovery or creation of new forms of 
moral hazard, the creation of economic holdups, increasing transaction and information costs, and 
similar activities (Appelbaum & Katz, 1987; Krueger, 1974). Such problems that can arise in private 
organizations as well (Foss, Foss & Klein, 2007; Stern & Feldman, 2004), but may be moderated 
more by forces of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934) and hard budget constraints (Kornai, 1986). 
Summary 
In short, political actors -- elected officials, government bureaucrats or civil servants, as well 
as individuals and organizations seeking to use the political process to accomplish private objectives 
-- can up to a point be described using the language of entrepreneurship theory. Like Kirznerian 
(1973) entrepreneurs,  political  actors seek  to create  or discover opportunities for gain,  whether 
private or social. Like Knightian (1921) entrepreneurs, they invest resources, tangible and intangible 
(time, effort, and reputation), in anticipation of uncertain future rewards. Like Schumpeterian (1934)  
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entrepreneurs, they can introduce new political products and processes. Public entrepreneurs may 
also set-up organizations and institute organizational change to further their perceived public and 
private interests. Unlike private entrepreneurs, however, public entrepreneurs cannot use privately 
appropriated benefits as a criterion for success, and the selection mechanism for allocating resources 
over time towards more successful public entrepreneurs is complex and not well understood. 
Competitive forces are typically weaker in the public domain than in the private market-
place, because objectives are poorly defined, performance is more difficult to gauge, and elections 
only occur on specific times, which may engender political business cycles (Nordhaus, 1975). Assent 
to political power can also entrench individuals and organizations leading to duopolistic political 
structures with similar policies and collusive attitudes, and even political dynasties and clans – not 
unknown even in mature democracies. These differences suggest that it may be much more difficult 
to weed out poor political entrepreneurs from poor private ones (Mueller, 2003; Pitelis & Clarke, 
1993). Importantly, political entrepreneurs are likely to undertake actions that foster economic value 
if they also personally benefit from these actions in ways other than the mere private appropriation 
of value created.  
Table 1 summarizes this section. The first column lists concepts from the existing private 
entrepreneurship research literature, the second shows how each concept can be manifest in public 
entrepreneurship, the third lists issues and problems with the conceptualization, and the fourth 
column  provides  references  to  the  extant  literature.  The  Table  illustrates  the  variety  of  terms, 
concepts, illustrations, and issues that occupy this emerging research literature.  
------------------------------------------ 




PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
These concepts of private entrepreneurship help suggest a framework for establishing and 
developing a research program on public entrepreneurship. This section describes four levels of 
analysis for understanding the public entrepreneur and public entrepreneurial action. 
First, we use the terms private and public to define ends, not means. Private action, in this 
sense,  is  pursued  to  improve  the  actor‘s  well-being,  narrowly  defined.  Firms  pursuing  profit, 
cooperatives seeking to generate returns for their members, politicians seeking to advance their own 
careers or reward their financial backers, all qualify as private action.  By contrast, the textbook 
government agency, delivering public goods to citizens, and social enterprises are public actors. In 
other words, we do not focus on the distinction between voluntary, market action and coercive, 
government action (though we recognize its importance more generally). By public we mean ―in the 
public interest,‖ whether the means used are voluntary (e.g., the Red Cross) or governmental (e.g., a 
municipal police force) (Mises, 1944). Likewise, we do not focus on the legal form of organization 
within which public entrepreneurial action takes place (Austen, Stevenson & Wei-Skillern).  
We propose four levels of analysis for studying public entrepreneurship and its relationship 
to private entrepreneurial behavior (see Table 2):  
1.  Rules of the game. Public entrepreneurship identifies goals, establishes terms, and otherwise sets a 
framework for the pursuit of private interests and other public interests. Public entrepreneurship 
establishes rules of the game (for good or ill), and private entrepreneurship is the play of the 
game (Ostrom, 1965).  
 
2.  New public organizations.  Another manifestation of public entrepreneurship is the creation of new 
public  organizations  (Bartlett  &  Dibben,  2002;  Schnellenbach,  2007).  Such  institutions  are 
rooted in and constrained by resources for which property rights may be ambiguous and subject 
to agency problems. Many of these problems have been studied compellingly in the fields of 
public administration and political science. Yet little research has comprehensively addressed 
methods  for  recognizing  opportunities,  marshalling  resources,  and  establishing  governance 




3.  Creative management of public resources.  The identification, creation, and development by public 
actors of new resources that are either publicly owned or that are integral to the public interest 
(Lewis, 1980; Roberts & King, 1996).  The emphasis in research on public institutions – again 
centered in fields other than management – has focused on public agency and activity rather 
than on stewardship of resources for which property rights are partly or wholly public. 
 
4.  Spillovers from private actions to the public domain. Private entrepreneurs pursuing private objectives 
may seek to create and clarify public interests, infrastructure, institutions, norms and procedures 
because their absence is strategically limiting of their private interests.  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Within and across all four levels, public entrepreneurs are alert to opportunities for gain, 
exercise judgment over the use of private and public resources, and may pursue innovative products 
and processes.  Relative to private entrepreneurs, the objectives are complex and often ill-specified; 
measurement of public gains and losses is difficult; the selection environment is complicated; and 
private and public resources may be deployed in socially harmful as well as beneficial ways.   
PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE 21st CENTURY 
With this framework in mind, we turn next to some important public-policy challenges.  We 
organize our discussion around the four levels of analysis discussed above. 
Rules of the game: the institutional environment for private action  
One important manifestation of public entrepreneurship is novelty or innovation regarding 
the institutional environment or rules of the game (constitutions, laws, norms, property rights and 
regulatory systems), which is our first level of analysis above. Typically, private entrepreneurship is 
assumed to focus on value creation and capture within a set of (shifting and non-immutable) rules 
(Argyres  &  Liebeskind,  1998;  Lee,  Peng  &  Barney,  2007).  And  yet,  entrepreneurial  activity  is 
embedded  in  a  particular  institutional  environment  (Coase,  1998;  Klein,  2000;  North,  1991;  
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Williamson,  2000). Any change in  the  institutional  environment  brought about by public-sector 
entrepreneurship changes the setting in which private-sector (and public sector) entrepreneurship 
takes place. Furthermore, the legal political and institutional system establishes the general guidelines 
concerning political entrepreneurial behavior (Baumol, 1990; Coase, 1960), which is not immutable, 
and can be enabling as well as constraining.  
While entrepreneurship, like bargaining, takes place in the shadow of the law (Cooter, Marks & 
Mnookin, 1982), public entrepreneurship also involves changes to the very law and its shadow!  That 
is, public entrepreneurship involves novelty, change and innovation vis-à-vis the rules of the game 
(Rodrik, 1996). Ostrom, for example, shows that an ―immensely complicated‖ (1990: 127) negative 
externality problem of over-exploitation of ground water basins in California was successfully solved 
via public entrepreneurship by the decentralized water companies themselves, but only after a judge 
issued a credible threat to enforce a solution that would have disadvantaged all decision makers 
involved.  In this instance, public entrepreneurship by the judge involved the shaping of incentives 
in a way unanticipated by the usual treatments of entrepreneurship, e.g., Schumpeter (1934) treats 
entrepreneurship as sui generis, not a response to market or institutional incentives.  
Moreover, public and commercial entrepreneurial processes evolve in ways that are mutually 
reinforcing, challenging and legitimizing. Kaplan and Murray (2009) maintain that private entrepren-
eurship in biotechnology was fundamentally influenced by the co-evolution of public institutions, 
private  corporations,  and  scientific  discovery.  Analysis  of  the  three  major  phases  of  the  bio-
technology industry‘s development since the 1970s shows that the commercial viability of the bio-
technology  industry  rested  on  the  resolution  of  fundamental  questions  about  public  safety,  the 
legitimacy of private ownership of the human genome, and rules for private use of findings from 
publicly-funded science. Entrepreneurship in the public domain to resolve these questions is a hall-
mark of the effectiveness of successful commercial entrepreneurs (Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007).   
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Even in established industries, private-sector entrepreneurial firms must also work within, 
and sometimes inform and shape, the design of public institutions such as regulatory bodies, though 
this process can involve not only cost-saving innovation but also rent-seeking and other forms of 
wealth transfer. Organizational sociology also suggests that political institutions and organizations 
may be characterized by embeddedness and isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Granovetter, 
1985). Political entrepreneurs are constrained by the need to fit existing norms and conventions, to 
plug into existing networks, and to avoid excessive novelty. 
The concept of market and eco-system creation and co-creation (Pitelis & Teece, 2010) is 
also relevant here. Numerous acts by the state, for example, the setting-up and function of the 
American Research and Development (ARD) after the Second World War, helped co-create markets 
and eco-systems – the US venture capital industry and high-tech clusters. Viewing states and public 
entrepreneurs  as  market  and  eco-system  co-creators  helps  endogenize  the  public-private  nexus, 
moves the discussion beyond cost minimization and more towards the leveraging of advantages and 
capabilities, with an eye to unleashing diverse human potential (Ostrom, 1965). Success, of course, 
depends on the incentives, constraints, evaluation, and governance; in other words, the analysis must 
be extended to determine if this value serves a public purpose, or is simply appropriated by state 
officials  and  politically  connected  private  agents.  Providing  an  institutional  setting  in  which 
entrepreneurial firms can appropriate some of these gains while preserving the spillover benefits for 
the  economy  as  a  whole,  is  critical  for  fostering  organizational  innovation  in  the  public  sector 
(Schnellenbach, 2007).  
Creating new public organizations 
Public entrepreneurship can also be conceived as the emergence and growth of new formal 
organizations, such as government bureaus, nonprofit or social enterprises, and the like. This has 
been examined extensively in the fields of public administration and political science (Bartlett &  
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Dibben,  2002;  Schnellenbach,  2007).  Public  entrepreneurs,  in  this  context,  are  individuals  and 
groups who identify opportunities for achieving social or political objectives, assemble and invest 
resource  to  achieve  these  objectives,  and  (possibly)  direct  the  newly  created  public  or  private 
enterprise.  Here, the vast literature on new-venture creation provides considerable insight (e.g., Acs 
& Audretsch, 2007). However, these entrepreneurs may have difficulty articulating and measuring 
objectives and may use public, as well as private, resources, suggesting the  higher potential for 
unproductive rent-seeking. Moreover, while they compete with other kinds of enterprises in factor 
markets, because they do not produce output that is bought and sold in markets, they do not face 
the same kind of product-market competition as private entrepreneurs. Government funds can also 
render the constraint they face ―soft‖ (Kornai, 1986), making it more difficult to measure perform-
ance and to make decisions about continuing or abandoning the venture. 
The state itself, in this context, can be understood using the language of entrepreneurship 
theory and practice.  The efficient allocation and creation of resources in the public interest requires 
large, often multinational systems for evaluating investment opportunities and for pursuing them 
effectively. The market, the firm (particularly the multinational enterprise [MNE]) and the nation-
state are institutional devices for resource allocation and creation globally. A voluminous and fast-
growing  research  literature  on  markets  and  hierarchies,  particularly  their  raisons  d'être,  evolution, 
attributes and interrelationships has been developed (Mahoney, 2005). The relationship between 
MNEs,  nation  states,  and  international  organizations  has  also  received  interest  in  recent  years 
(Bhagwati, 2005; Dunning and Pitelis, 2008). Yet interactions between these institutions and the 
governance of resources in the public interest by alternative forms of markets, firms, nation-states 
and collective action -- i.e., Markets, Hierarchies, and Politics --  have not been as fully explored.  
The possibility of opportunistic (or, more mildly, own utility-maximizing) behavior by public 
entrepreneurs,  particularly  state  functionaries,  is  explicitly  accounted  for  in  public-choice  and  
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Chicago School perspectives (Mueller, 2003; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). One salient type of failure 
is empire building in which state functionaries increase their utility by increasing the size and span of 
control of their organizations. Maximization of state functionaries‘ utility and demands by powerful 
organized groups of producers and trades unions,  which can capture the state,  help explain its 
dramatic growth in OECD countries (Shapiro & Taylor, 1990). States can be captured by organized 
interest  groups,  which  hinder  efficient  allocation  of  resources  (Olson,  1965).  Transaction  costs 
theory suggests that such capture means that markets should be allowed to operate more freely, 
while the state should limit itself to the provision of stable rules of the game, for example, a clear 
delineation and enforcement of property rights (Alvarez & Parker, 2009; North, 1990). 
North (1990) joined the transaction  costs and public-choice perspectives on the  state in 
which a wealth- or utility-maximizing ruler trades a group of services (e.g., protection, justice) for 
revenue,  acting  as  a  discriminating  monopolist,  by  devising  property  rights  for  each  so  as  to 
maximize state revenue, subject to the constraint of potential entry by rulers of other states. The 
objective is to increase rents to the ruler and, subject to that, to reduce transaction costs in order to 
foster more output, with the increased tax revenues accruing to the ruler. The existing and potential 
competition  from  rivals  and  the  transaction  costs  in  state  activities  typically  tend  to  produce 
inefficient  property  rights  often  leading  to  favoring  powerful  constituents  and  the  granting  of 
monopolies. Thus, the existence of competitive rivalry and positive transaction costs gives rise to a 
conflict between a property rights structure that produces economic growth and one that maximizes 
rents appropriated by the ruler, and therefore accounts for widespread inefficient property rights 
(North,  1981).  Indeed,  North  states  that:  ―the  coercive  power  of  the  state  has  been  employed 
throughout most of history inimical to economic growth.‖ (1990: 14). 
Our approach to public entrepreneurship allows a generalization of North‘s (1990) theory. 
Drawing on Cyert and March (1963) increased output engenders resources that can be leveraged to  
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alleviate conflicts. In addition, by rearranging property rights, establishing new bureaus or other 
forms of organization, and facilitating the forcible transfer of resources among private agents, state 
functionaries can generate value that can be directed toward public or (politically-favored) private 
ends. The concept of a nationwide strategy for growth, which in North‘s (1990) context, can be seen 
as the set of state policies intended to reduce private sector transaction costs so as to increase 
realized output in the form of income, can thus be framed as a form of public entrepreneurship. The 
Coase Theorem suggests that the internalization of private sector activities by the state — i.e., the 
increase in public sector, relative to private sector, entrepreneurial activity — should be pursued up 
to the point where an additional transaction or production activity would be produced at equal cost 
in the private sector (Coase, 1960). This focus points towards the need for pluralism in institutional 
forms; i.e., the complementarity between public and private sectors for the efficient production and 
allocation of resources (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). 
An extension to the approach of North (1990) has more recently been proposed by Olson 
(2000), which suggests that an important function of the state is market augmentation that helps 
increase  output  through  the  revenue  side.  Growth  can  be  achieved  via  domestic  and  foreign 
demand,  while  income-rent  will  be  affected  positively  through  both  reductions  in  transaction-
production costs and increases in revenues through, for example, a focus on high-return sectors 
and/or  the  creation  of  agglomerations  (Krugman,  1990;  Porter,  1990).  It  follows  that  national 
strategy could be designed to reduce overall production and transaction costs for the economy, but 
could also influence the revenue side, so as to increase the income accruing to the nation and (thus) 
taxes to the state. In this context, state functionaries could be argued to act as public entrepreneurs 
(Sheingate, 2003; Yu, 1997). This approach endogenizes the public-private nexus. 
What  about  competition  among  states  and  other  public  entities?    In  the  private  sector, 
competition in product and labor markets constrains opportunistic behavior by agents and value- 
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destroying activities by principals.  Identifying a workable degree of competition for political power 
is  a  critical  issue  that  has  not  been  explored  to  date.  For  example,  the  one  extreme  of  no 
competition is dictatorship. The other extreme of fully contestable political positions can render the 
pursuit of long-term value creating public entrepreneurial objectives difficult – given the short term 
pressures by organized powerful groups (Olson, 1965). A possible solution may involve the fostering 
of hybrid sectors (beyond market and hierarchy), such as consumer associations and NGOs (Guay, 
Doh & Sinclair, 2004). In addition, the ―optimal‖ timing of elections and the degree of contestability 
of political power positions are important areas that have been little conceptualized so far, especially 
by organization scholars. 
It is critical, for example, to ensure that endogenous private-public interactions add system-
wide value in a sustainable way. Achieving this objective requires the avoidance of regulatory capture 
by state functionaries (Levine & Forrence, 1990; Stigler, 1971). It also requires the provision of 
incentives, sanctions and enablement that channels public entrepreneurship towards this goal. Last 
but not least, it requires an ideological and ethical infrastructure that channels energy to creative and 
value adding actions, and rewards those who act accordingly (Etzioni, 1988; North, 1990). Rodrik 
(2004) suggests that to solve market failures and also avoid capture, state functionaries should be 
involved in dialogue with the private sector while maintaining an arms-length relationship. However, 
such an approach is not likely to be sufficient to avoid capture by state functionaries. For Mahoney, 
McGahan and Pitelis (2009), protection can be better achieved through pluralism and a diversity of 
institutional and organizational forms that serve the function of mutual monitoring, accountability, 
and stewardship. Such an institutional setting could enable private-public interactions to operate in a 
more virtuous way and enhance the possibility of global sustainable value creation, a concept that 
offers many advantages over the standard economics focus on Pareto efficiency (Kapur, 2002; Kaul,  
Grunberg & Stern, 1999; Stiglitz, 1999).   
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Finally, we think the entrepreneurial perspective sheds light on the current large-scale failures 
of public institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Demyanyk & Hemet, 2008).  Many of 
the most salient opportunities relate to the interplay between public and private objectives in these 
institutions (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004). First, the role of these public 
agencies as priority-balancing bodies cannot be understated. Private entrepreneurs must evaluate 
risks that influence the organization‘s prospects for survival and profitability. In public agencies, 
ambiguity in the objective function caused by ill-defined goals, an indirect relationship between 
public interest and personal benefit, and the difficulty of measuring successes and failures, makes 
achievement of this balance difficult. Techniques such as real-options analysis and scenario planning 
may prove essential for defining and managing competing public interests, and for balancing public 
objectives over time as the constituent goals of private parties change (Lee, Peng & Barney, 2007). 
The  lack  of  clear  metrics  for  goal  achievement  (such  as  profitable  growth)  and  a  lack  of  a 
competitive selection environment render these techniques problematic. 
Second, entrepreneurs must contend with information asymmetry and uncertainty that is 
partly reducible and partly irreducible (Henisz & Zelner, 2003; Libecap, 1989). Mechanisms for 
extracting information and for evaluating and managing uncertainty of each type have been widely 
studied in the extant entrepreneurship literature (Dew, et al., 2009; Sarasvathy, 2001). Public institu-
tions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac regularly rely on conventional models of risk assessment 
that  are  common  in  the  insurance  industries,  for  example,  but  contemporary  techniques  from 
information economics may represent further opportunities for analysis. In particular, finding ways 
to evaluate and rank risky options that are essentially qualitative -- because they are not embodied in 
market prices and quantities -- is critical to public-sector entrepreneurial decision-making. 
Third,  intertemporal  theories  of  change  offer  opportunities  for  advancing  our  under-
standing of institutional inertia in the public domain. Conventionally, this inertia has been viewed  
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principally as a brake on ill-considered adaptations. Yet as the current environment reminds us, 
inertia may be a potent source of diseconomy under punctuated change (Baumgartner & Jones, 
1991). Such inertia may be due to distorted perceptions (that may stem from myopia, hubris, denial 
and/or groupthink), dulled motivation, failed creative responses, action disconnects, and political 
deadlock (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Janis, 1972; Rumelt, 1995). 
Creative management of public resources by public actors  
Public entrepreneurship can also refer to the innovative management of existing, publicly 
owned resources to achieve  established ends, our third level  of analysis  (Mair &  Mariti,  2006).  
Continual, incremental efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public institutions are 
expected in modern, democratic societies. Some public figures have taken controversial steps to 
improve  the  efficiency  of  public  institutions  even  by  disenfranchising  well-established  minority 
interest groups, such as when nine departments of government were consolidated to create the 
Department of Homeland Security (Relyea, 2004). Individuals and groups also work continually to 
reshape public institutions to create and extract (private) economic rents, and it can be difficult to 
distinguish the former set of activities from the latter -- particularly when the pursuit of private gain 
is cloaked in the mantle of the public interest (Yandle, 1983).  
Are current issues regarding innovation in the public interest qualitatively different from 
older ones? One opportunity for further inquiry is in study of the emergence of private entrepren-
eurial firms that seek to commercialize activities pursued in the public interest. The explosive growth 
of private military companies such as Blackwater and  MPRI since the end of World War II is 
paradigmatic  of  the  process  of  public  sector  organizational  innovation  (Avant,  2005;  Baum  & 
McGahan, 2009). The growth of these industries depends on the interplay between the resolution of 
public concerns, development of public institutions, and relative effectiveness of private organiza-
tions over public agencies at fulfilling public interests. In the case of private-military companies,  
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some public figures have even gone as far as to divert the pursuit of the public interest toward 
private companies to favor the achievement of the public‘s efficiency goals even over other elements 
of the public interest, such as public debate and scrutiny.  
Other public entrepreneurs focus on process, not particular programs or activities. Howard 
Jarvis, a private entrepreneur with a long career of organizational innovation in the public interest, is 
archetypical of a class of people that have been celebrated for their accomplishments. Jarvis gained 
fame, notoriety & accolades, and was featured on the cover of the June 19, 1978 cover of Time 
Magazine for advocating Proposition 13 in California, which cut property taxes by 57% and inspired 
a national debate over taxation. Jarvis relied on door-to-door and street canvassing to collect the 
tens of thousands of signatures required to put Proposition 13 on the ballot (Smith, 1998).  
Entrepreneurs such as Jarvis often arrive into public life with agendas, accumulated skills, 
relationships and capabilities that become the cornerstones of their impact. In the ―learn, earn, 
serve‖ model heralded on today‘s campuses, many students embark upon careers in the private-
sector upon graduation with the intention of accumulating credentials and capital so as to eventually 
support careers of public service (Austen, 1997).   
Spillovers from private actions to the public domain 
Private organizations also have an impact on public debate through hybrid structures in 
which  their  agendas  are  temporarily  or  only  partially  aligned  with  public  interests.  The  private 
military contractors described above are an extreme example (Singer, 2003). More familiar examples 
include a wide range of multinationals that provide goods and services to public agencies and in the 
public interest for private gain. Such stalwarts of industry as IBM, General Electric and General 
Motors have long been suppliers to local, state and federal agencies with relatively little controversy. 
Other  firms,  including Nestle  and Coca-Cola,  have  sold  products  both to  the  government  and 
private  purchasers  concurrently  but  with  controversy:  Nestle‘s  baby  milk  products  have  been  
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promoted as a healthful alternative to breast milk, contrary to the advice of many physicians (Sethi, 
1994), and Coca-Cola has been cited as an inappropriate consumer of precious clean water in India 
(Kaye, 2004).  Social networking, social media, and what Benkler (2006) calls ―commons-based peer 
production‖ are examples of private, voluntary collective action resulting in public goods – often 
highly tangible, commercially valuable goods. The recent explosion of academic interest in public-
private partnerships testifies to their growing economic, political, and social importance (Glachant & 
Saussier, 2006; Martimort & Pouyet, 2008; Rangan, Samii & Van Wassenhove, 2006). So does the 
similar explosion of interest in corporate social responsibility (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Judge, 
2009; McWilliams, Siegel & Wright, 2006). 
Hertz (2002) submits that the culture of commerce has become so dominant and prevalent 
that private  life  has taken over public interests in  a way that while often benign, is sometimes 
pernicious. The upshot is that the interplay between public and private interests is important and 
political mechanisms seem to be increasingly constrained by private organizations. As Horsman and 
Marshall (1994), echoing Vernon (1971), put it:  
Effortless  communications  across  boundaries  undermine  the  nation-state‘s  control; 
increased  mobility,  and  the  increased  willingness  of  people  to  migrate,  undermines  its 
cohesiveness. Business abhors borders, and seeks to circumvent them. Information travels 
across borders and nation-states are hard pressed to control the flow. . . . The nation-state     
. . . is increasingly powerless to withstand these pressures.  
 
Horsman and Marshall‘s (1994) assessment is offered with alarm, but the ability of multinational 
firms to resist and reshape government action may result not only in private capture, but also in 
more efficient and effective public institutions (Jones, Pollitt & Bek, 2007).  
Baum and McGahan‘s (2009) examination of the mechanisms that led to the outsourcing of 
military services shows how changes over time in public interests -- accumulated subsequent to the 
establishment of fixed capabilities and their embodiment in institutions -- can lead to the resolution 
of public interest problems through outsourcing to private companies on markets. In some cases,  
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such as the European Union‘s market for pollution rights or the proposal to create a regulated 
market for human organs, the state legitimizes, and indeed creates, a market to serve a perceived 
public interest (Jordan, et al. 2003). These examples illustrate how temporal changes in strategic 
priorities for public agencies may be implemented under constraints created by prior solutions to the 
deployment of resources in the public interest. 
Private organizations such as the Rockefeller and Gates Foundations (Fisher, 2003; Muraskin, 
2006) may, as a specific mission, support or even create public agencies, particularly in developing 
countries (Ramamurti, 2004). For-profit firms such as Sekem, which has become a world leader in 
organic foods and phyto-pharmaceuticals in Egypt (Merckens & Shalaby, 2001), and Bangladesh‘s 
Grameen Bank can be effective in promoting economic development by facilitating private and 
social  entrepreneurship  (Mainsah,  et  al.,  2004;  Rahman,  1999).  Such  private-sector  philanthropic 
ventures and their public-sector counterparts do not always exist in harmony. For example, the 
Gates  Foundation,  lauded  for  its  effectiveness  in  global  public  health,  has  been  criticized  for 
diverting resources in resource-limited countries from generalized public health services to specific 
diseases that are of interest to the Foundation such as HIV/AIDS (Shiffman, 2008). This example 
raises questions about the balancing of competing public interests. According to Garrett (2007), 
while addressing HIV/AIDs in Haiti may be a public health objective, the success of the initiatives 
sponsored by the Gates Foundation in controlling the disease there has raised the costs of pursuing 
other, closely related, public health interests in the country. In general, the economical balancing of 
competing public interests may be neglected by the private organizations hired to pursue them.  
In the US, the infusion of large amounts of public funds into private financial institutions, 
and the concurrent restraints placed upon their governance, vividly illustrates how, over time, public 
and private interests co-evolve. In the weeks prior to the unraveling of Lehman Brothers in the 
summer of 2008, the robustness of the US financial system continued to be lauded by leaders in  
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both the private and public sectors. Yet the sub-prime lending crisis and the associated explosion of 
innovations such as derived securities had become an albatross on the world economy (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009). The United States‘ largest federal agencies responded with the largest government 
bailout in world history (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
When do private-sector entrepreneurial firms challenge public interests, and when does such 
entrepreneurship threaten the public interest so extensively that a major re-conceptualization of 
critical institutions is required, such as has been currently requested by US automakers? When is the 
most economical response one of allowing private bankruptcy, and when does the public interest in 
avoiding  large  welfare  payments  such  as  are  possible  to  laid-off  autoworkers  make  a  bailout 
desirable? The answers to these questions require an understanding of the intertemporal economics 
of public entrepreneurship, with particular research attention to the consequences of risk-sharing 
schemes and incentive compatibility (North, 2005; Olson, 2000).  
Thus, actions in the public interest are complex in ways that the theory suggest, but also raise 
new questions for theory. Institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation, Fannie Mae, and Freddie 
Mac evolve as organizations in pursuit of the public interest, and yet also may be inadequately 
studied as the embodiments of governance structures and entrepreneurial systems in pursuit of the 
common interest.  Entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates and Howard Jarvis may shape institutions to 
reflect private beliefs about the public interest.  At the same time, the actions of both private and 
public organizations may be complicit in the public interest in ways that are not clearly evident: The 
failure of large numbers of US financial institutions during 2008 made vivid the consequences of 
their  interdependencies  for  the  public  interest.  More  research  is  required  on  the  processes  of 
organizational entrepreneurship both in the fulfillment and shaping of public interest.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has outlined an approach to public entrepreneurship that builds on contemporary 
entrepreneurship theory, adding insights on the role of institutions and the nature of the modern 
state.  While some political science and public choice economics research has explored the nature 
and effects of public entrepreneurship, a systematic account of the public entrepreneur and the ways 
in which public sector entrepreneurship differs from its private-sector counterpart is mostly absent 
from the extant research literature, particularly in strategic management and organization. We hope 
this paper stimulates further research on extending entrepreneurship theory to non-market settings 
and developing more robust explanations for the state and for private-public (e.g., firm-government) 
interactions. Such research should result in applied insights for the design of effective public policies 
and a stronger alignment between public and private objectives. 
Our main line of reasoning is two-fold. First, we claim that public entrepreneurs do, in many 
ways, act  like  private  ones,  although  there  are  important  differences  related  to  the  difficulty  in 
measuring performance, ill-defined objectives, collective action problems, softer budget constraints, 
and the legal monopoly of coercion. Second, we note that public and private entrepreneurship while 
typically  treated  in  isolation  in  fact  co-evolve  in  important  ways  (Ostrom,  1965,  1990).  Private 
entrepreneurship occurs in a public context, and public action is undertaken by individual actors.  As 
a result, the modern state contains elements of both private and public entrepreneurial behavior.   
Opportunities for public entrepreneurship research arise at each of four levels (Table 2), and 
reflect the co-evolution of public and private interests, institutions, resources, activities, and govern-
ance  in  rule-making  (Level  1),  the  creation  of  new  public  enterprises  (Level  2),  the  innovative 
stewardship of public resources (Level 3), or the public spillover benefits of private entrepreneurship 
(Level 4).  A further step would be to examine the interactions among levels.  Are efforts to craft 
new formal and informal norms, legal frameworks, and the like complements to, or substitutes for,  
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efforts by private actors to pursue philanthropic goals?  Ostrom‘s (1965) example of the California 
water industry suggests a complementarity between public rulemaking and private efforts to solve 
practical, economic problems, but this is only one example. How general is this complementarity 
relationship? What are the other interactions effects?  What are the appropriate empirical methods 
for examining them?  Most of our examples here are case studies. How can the appropriate variables 
and relationships be parameterized to permit quantitative empirical research?  As the privatization 
research literature indicates, the key explanatory factors and performance results are difficult to 
measure consistently across space and time (Megginson & Netter, 2001). How can researchers break 
through the difficulties to conduct cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons? 
Another opportunity is in breaking the boundary between public and private action. Theories 
of public entrepreneurship are principally theories of group or collective entrepreneurship, whose 
research is at a nascent stage of development (Burress & Cook, 2009). How do collectives form, 
evolve and dissolve?  We suggest a theory of public entrepreneurship as an important application of 
group or team problems in an entrepreneurial setting (Foss, et al., 2008). Efforts to develop a theory 
of team entrepreneurship have focused on shared mental models, team cognition, and capabilities to 
assemble  and  lead  complementary  and  co-specialized  assets  (Kor,  Mahoney  &  Michael,  2007; 
Mosakowski,  1998;  Pitelis  &  Teece,  2010).  Entrepreneurs  can  also  form  networks  to  share 
expectations of the potential returns to projects (Greve & Salaff, 2003).  
Within the private firm, too, entrepreneurial decision making is entwined with problems of 
collective action (Hansmann, 1996; Olson, 1965). Private entrepreneurship is typically a team or 
group  activity.  Venture  capital,  later-stage  private  equity,  and  bank  loans  are  often  syndicated; 
publicly-traded  equity  is  diffusely  held;  and  professional-services  firms  and  closed-membership 
cooperatives  represent  jointly-owned  pools  of  risk  capital  (Brander,  Amit  &  Antweiler,  2002). 
Moreover, the firm‘s top management team -- to whom key decision rights are delegated -- can be  
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regarded as a bundle of heterogeneous human resources, the interactions among which are critical to 
the firm‘s performance (Foss, et al., 2008). Once an entrepreneurial opportunity has been perceived, 
decision makers must assemble a team of investors and a management team, raising problems of 
internal governance (Kor & Mahoney, 2005). Shared objectives must be formulated; different time 
horizons reconciled; and free-riding mitigated (Casson, 2005; Cyert & March, 1963; Pitelis, 2007). 
Thus, organizational and governance problems specific to public entrepreneurship are closely related 
to  general  problems  of  team,  group,  organizational  or  collective  entrepreneurship.  Research  on 
private entrepreneurship within organizations – corporations, partnerships, cooperatives -- should 
be helpful in understanding public entrepreneurship. 
Our analysis points to the idea that public entrepreneurship is a management phenomenon.  
Entrepreneurial  ideas  are  framed,  developed,  pursued,  institutionalized  and  enacted  through 
processes that are both analogous to and intertwined with private entrepreneurship.  Unleashing 
creative energy in pursuit of the public interest requires a sophisticated approach to the management 
of  innovation  in  the  public  domain.  We  look  forward  to  exploring  these  connections  as  the 
management field develops a research stream in public entrepreneurship that enriches both theory 
and practice. Indeed, firm-government interactions are where much of the action of contemporary 
exchange  resides,  and  thus,  a  nuanced  and  sophisticated  theory  of  public  entrepreneurship  will 
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Table 1: Concepts of the Entrepreneurial Function, Private and Public 
 
Concept of  
Entrepreneurship 
Manifestation in Private 
Entrepreneurship 
Application to Public 
Entrepreneurship  
 
Issues and Problems 
 
References 
Alertness to profit 
opportunities                
(Kirzner, 1973) 
 Management literature on 
opportunity recognition 
 Austrian economics 
literature on market 
equilibration 
  Sensing shifts in public 
preferences  
  Anticipating common 
problems 
  Identifying out-of-date 
practices, agencies, and 
other institutions 
  Avoiding undesirable 
outcomes in the public 
interest 
 Lack of market prices, difficulty 
in measuring profit, “soft budget 
constraints” 
  Complex, hard-to-specify objectives 
  Misalignment of interests between 
decision-makers and the general 
public; likelihood of rent-seeking 
 Pursuit of valuable opportunities 
may be constrained by 
bureaucratic procedure 
 Exchanges based on coercion, 
not consent 
 Identifying and managing 
uncertain outcomes  
Bellone & Goerl, 1992;  
Holcombe, 1992;  
Jacobson, 1992; 
Kirzner, 1997; 
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; 
Schuler, Rehbein & Cramer, 2002; 
Shane & Venkatraman, 2000 
Judgmental decision-
making under 
uncertainty                     
(Knight, 1921)                         
 Economics and finance 
literatures on investment 
and capital budgeting 
 Management  literature on 
judgment-based 
entrepreneurship 
 Investment of public 
resources to meet political 
objectives 
  Evaluating the suitability of 
various policies for achieving 
particular outcomes  
 Identifying gamesmanship 
nominally in pursuit of 
public interests but truly in 
private interests 
  Decision-makers don‟t put their 
own assets at risk 
  Political actors may have very 
short time horizons 
  Discernment of coalition-
building from the pursuit of 
private interests 
 
Foss & Klein, 2005; 
Foss, Klein, Kor & Mahoney, 2008; 
Kor, Mahoney & Michael, 2007; 
Langlois, 2007; 
McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; 
Mises, 1944, 1949;  
Penrose, 1959; 
Ostrom, 1965, 1990 
Innovation 




practices)           
(Schumpeter, 1934) 
 Economics and 
management literatures on 
product and process 
innovation 
 Introduction of new policy 
proposals, political 
positions, or paradigms 
 Introduction of new 
procedures (e.g., the local 
ballot initiative) 
 Changing administrative or 
electoral procedures 
 Lobbying and other forms of 
rent-seeking 
  Decision-makers don‟t put their 
own assets at risk 
  Political actors may have very 
short time horizons 
  Bureaucratic organization is 
highly path dependent 
  Identifying tradeoffs between 
short- and long-run interests 
 
Bartlett & Dibben, 2002; 
Kirchheimer, 1989;                           
Mack, Green & Vedlitz, 2008; 
Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; 
Schneider and Teske, 1992; 
Schneider, Teske & Mintrom, 1995; 
Schnellenbach, 2007;    
Wohlgemuth, 2000  
 
 
Table 2: A Framework for Studying Public Entrepreneurship 
 
Level of analysis  Examples, issues, problems 
 
 
Rules of the game 
 
  Creation or implementation of new laws, administrative 
procedures, informal norms 
  Establishes rules of the game, within which private agents  





New public organizations 
 
  Establishment of new governmental or nonprofit agencies or 
enterprises.  
  Involves judgmental decision-making about privately and 
publicly owned resources.  
  Objectives and performance difficult to measure, and selection 




Creative management of public resources 
 
  Organization and reorganization of states and state agencies 




Spillovers of private actions to the public domain 
 
  Pursuit of social and nonprofit objectives by private individuals 
and firms 
  Includes establishment of social norms and values 
 